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A Functional Approach to Judicial Review
of PTAB Rulings on Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact
Rebecca S. Eisenberg*
ABSTRACT: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”)
has long relied on active appellate review to bring uniformity and clarity to
patent law. It initially treated the PTO the same as the federal district courts,
reviewing its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
Following reversal by the Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Federal
Circuit began giving greater deference to PTO factual findings. But it
continued to review the PTO’s legal conclusions de novo, while coding an
expansive list of disputed issues in patent cases as legal conclusions, even
when they rest on subsidiary factfinding.
Congress expanded the role of the PTO in adjudicating challenges to patent
validity in the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”),
authorizing new adjudicatory proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (“PTAB”) as an alternative to federal district court litigation. The
AIA provides for Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions, without specifying
standards of review. The scope of review could determine the success of these
proceedings as a quicker, cheaper, and more expert alternative to district court
litigation of patent challenges. The Federal Circuit applies the same standards
of review to PTAB decisions in AIA proceedings that it applies to other PTO
rulings, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for
substantial evidence. It also follows the same characterizations of issues as
legal or factual that it has long used in the context of court/court review. In
the past, by maximizing the scope of appellate review, these characterizations
allowed the Federal Circuit to exercise greater quality control over generalist
trial courts with limited competence to resolve patent matters. The net benefits
are more dubious as applied to decisions of expert PTAB panels in AIA
adjudications. Yet reversal rates at the Federal Circuit are essentially the same
for PTAB decisions as for decisions of district courts in patent cases,
*
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threatening to frustrate a system designed to improve patent quality while
limiting litigation costs.
This Essay reconsiders the proper scope of judicial review of PTAB rulings on
two issues that the Federal Circuit codes as legal conclusions with factual
underpinnings: nonobviousness and claim interpretation. Drawing on a
functional approach to judicial review of mixed questions of law and fact, it
argues for more deferential review of PTAB rulings on nonobviousness and
claim interpretation given the expertise of the administrative tribunal and the
case-specificity of the rulings. The Federal Circuit would do better to confine
de novo review to generalizable legal rulings that provide guidance in future
matters rather than replicating the work of the PTAB from the appellate bench
on routine case-specific rulings.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the heyday of Chevron deference to agencies’ interpretations of
the laws they administer,1 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“Federal Circuit”) took a notably less deferential approach toward the Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”).2 Treating the PTO the same as federal
district courts, the Federal Circuit reviewed its factual findings for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo.3

1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
2. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 299–300 (2007); John M. Golden, Working
Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1672–73 (2016); Jonathan S. Masur,
Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 277; Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and
Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831, 834–35 (2012); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing
Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1975 (2013).
3. See, e.g., In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We review questions of fact
arising from Board rejections under a clearly erroneous standard. . . . We review questions of law
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The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)
requires greater deference to PTO factual findings in its 1999 decision in
Dickinson v. Zurko.4 After that, the Federal Circuit recited that it reviews such
findings for “substantial evidence” in the administrative record rather than
for clear error.5 But it continued to review the PTO’s conclusions of law de
novo, reasoning that Chevron deference was not appropriate because the
Patent Act did not give the PTO rulemaking authority over substantive issues
of patent law.6 Meanwhile, the Federal Circuit defined an expanding list of
disputed issues in patent matters as questions of law.7
A potential game changer occurred in 2011 when Congress expanded
the PTO’s authority to engage in both rulemaking and adjudication in the
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).8 Concerned about the impact of
patents of dubious validity on innovation, Congress sought to provide a
quicker, cheaper, and more expert alternative to federal district courts for
adjudicating validity challenges.9 The AIA authorizes the PTO to resolve such
challenges in adjudicatory proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (“PTAB”),10 and to prescribe regulations for the conduct of these
proceedings.11 Some commentators argue that these new delegations of
authority call for greater deference to the PTO’s interpretations of ambiguous

de novo.”); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A]nticipation is a fact question
subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. . . . [The analysis] is the same whether it
was made by the [PTO B]oard or by a district court.”).
4. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163–65 (1999).
5. See, e.g., In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
6. E.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1374 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Board’s statutory
interpretation in a particular case is given no deference . . . .”). On procedural matters, the
Federal Circuit deferred to the PTO’s interpretations through rulemaking authorized by statute.
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2012); Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335–40 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (discussing availability of continuation applications).
7. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791,
1831 (2013) (noting the Federal Circuit has enhanced its authority over district courts by casting
important issues as questions of law); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1065–66 (2003) (arguing that Federal
Circuit decisions to limit deference to district courts and the PTO may reflect lack of confidence
in the competence of these institutions to decide issues correctly).
8. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
9. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: Challenging Patents
in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 235–36 (2015).
10. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 7(a). These new adjudicatory proceedings
include post-grant review proceedings (“PGR”) to adjudicate any available ground of invalidity
during the first nine months after a patent issues. Id. § 6(d). They also include inter partes review
proceedings (“IPR(s)”) after the nine-month PGR period has expired to adjudicate challenges
based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications. Id. § 6(a). Finally, these
proceedings include a transitional program to review the validity of covered business method
patents (“CBM”) on expanded grounds. Id. § 18(a).
11. Id. § 7(a).
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provisions in the Patent Act.12 On the other hand, some Federal Circuit judges
argue that administrative factfinding in the AIA PTAB proceedings should get
less deference than the Supreme Court required in Dickinson v. Zurko.13
An important category of PTAB determinations falls outside much of this
discourse: rulings that apply general legal standards to particular cases.
Arguably such rulings amount to statutory gap-filling under implicit
delegation of authority to the PTO from Congress, and are thus entitled to
Chevron deference.14 But the Federal Circuit calls these determinations
“conclusions of law” and reviews them de novo.15 In their specificity and
grounding in the evidence, these “legal conclusions” resemble fact finding
more than statutory interpretation, and they may indeed rest on subsidiary
findings that the Federal Circuit codes as factual.16 The Federal Circuit recites
that it reviews the underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, while
it reviews the ultimate rulings de novo.
Such issues predominate in inter partes review proceedings (“IPR(s)”),
which account for more than 90% of filings to date seeking AIA adjudications
before the PTAB.17 Although the PTAB may consider a broader set of issues
in other proceedings, the AIA limits the use of IPRs to challenges under
sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act (i.e., lack of novelty and obviousness)
based on prior art consisting of patents and printed publications.18 Both
determinations compare the challenged patent claim(s) to the prior art, often
raising disputes about the meaning of the claim language.19 Most IPRs thus

12. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare
Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1564 (2016); Tran, supra note 2, at 837; Wasserman, supra note 2, at
1977–2006; cf. Golden, supra note 2, at 1659 (arguing that Chevron deference is inappropriate
because the AIA does not give the PTAB authority to act with force of law, but that nonbinding
Skidmore deference may be appropriate).
13. See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
14. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (“In th[e] process of filling ‘any
[statutory] gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,’ the courts must respect the
interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering
the statutory program.” (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984))).
15. See, e.g., In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
16. For example, whether prior art anticipates an invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is a
question of fact. Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2015). But whether prior art makes an invention obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a question of
law based on underlying facts. SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1082 (Fed. Cir.
2014). For an excellent review, see generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY,
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 10.A (7th ed. 2017).
17. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD 3 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics
_20180731.pdf.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
19. See, e.g., Owens Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., 873 F.3d 896, 902–03 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(reversing a PTAB decision rejecting an obviousness challenge after concluding that claim
interpretation was incorrect); Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372,
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involve rulings on three issues: novelty, nonobviousness, and claim
interpretation. The Federal Circuit codes novelty as a question of fact,
reviewing agency findings for substantial evidence.20 But it codes
nonobviousness and claim interpretation as legal conclusions that it reviews
de novo (although it reviews subsidiary factual findings for substantial
evidence).21 This approach leaves considerable scope for appellate review of
two of the three principal issues in IPRs.
The AIA provides for Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions,22 without
specifying standards of review. The scope of review could determine the
success of these proceedings as a quicker, cheaper, and more expert
alternative to district court litigation for adjudicating challenges to patent
validity.23 Liberal use of de novo review adds to the cost and duration of
proceedings and prolongs uncertainty as to outcomes. The standards of
review that the Federal Circuit applies to PTAB decisions in AIA proceedings
today are generally preordained by its own prior characterizations of issues as
factual or legal in the context of court/court review. Perhaps in the past, de
novo review allowed the Federal Circuit to exercise greater quality control over
generalist trial courts with limited competence to resolve patent matters.24
The net benefits are more dubious as applied to decisions of expert PTAB
panels in AIA adjudications. Yet, reversal rates at the Federal Circuit are
essentially the same for PTAB decisions as for decisions of district courts in
patent cases,25 threatening to frustrate a system “designed to establish a more
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and
limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”26
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the proper scope of judicial
review of appealable PTAB rulings.27 It has, however, provided guidance for

1377–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (reversing the PTAB determination that challenged claims were not
anticipated where the PTAB failed to interpret a disputed claim term).
20. See In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 109 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
21. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Microsoft Corp. v.
Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods.,
Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 319.
23. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED.
CIR. B.J. 539, 598–99 (2012); see infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
24. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 46–52 (1989) (arguing that deferential review of fact finding in generalist district courts
presented obstacles to achieving uniformity in the patent system through appellate review by
specialized court); Rai, supra note 7, at 1040 (“The Federal Circuit’s exercise of de novo review over
fact finding may be rationalized by the argument that, despite the court’s appellate status, it still has
fact finding capabilities superior to those of the other decisionmakers in the patent system.”).
25. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
26. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011).
27. In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Court held that PTAB decisions on whether
to institute review are not reviewable on appeal and upheld a PTO rule that applies the broadest
reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) to patent claims that are challenged in PTAB proceedings.

E4_EISENBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

2392

7/25/2019 5:04 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:2387

judicial review of lower court rulings (court-court review) on mixed questions
of law and fact in other fields. The Court has embraced a nuanced, functional
approach that focuses on the nature of the inquiry, the comparative
advantages of the lower tribunal and the reviewing court in performing that
function, and the specificity or generalizability of the ruling, without assigning
talismanic significance to the labels “law” or “fact.”
This Essay borrows this functional analysis to reconsider the proper scope
of judicial review of PTAB decisions on two issues that the Federal Circuit
codes as legal conclusions with factual underpinnings: nonobviousness and
claim interpretation. Part II contrasts the Federal Circuit approach to review
of mixed questions of law and fact in patent law with the functional approach
of the Supreme Court to judicial review of lower court decisions on similar
questions in other fields, exemplified by the 2018 decision in U.S. Bank
National Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge.28 Part III considers judicial review of PTAB
rulings, looking to the APA and the AIA for guidance. Part IV applies a
functional analysis to reconsider judicial review of mixed questions of law and
fact that arise in PTAB proceedings, focusing on nonobviousness in Section
IV.A and on claim interpretation in Section IV.B. Part V considers how
functional considerations have shifted since the Federal Circuit was created,
calling into question the continued wisdom of applying an approach laid
down by an earlier generation of judges long before the creation of the PTAB.
II.

MIXED QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT

The Federal Circuit’s approach to judicial review rests on a strict
bifurcation of lower court rulings between legal conclusions and factual
findings, with no room for an intermediate category of mixed questions of law
and fact.29 This leads to puzzling discontinuities in standards of review for
similar questions based on apparently arbitrary differences in how they are
coded.
An example is the difference in standards of review for rulings on
“novelty” and “nonobviousness.” Legal standards for patentability require
comparing inventions to previously available technology (“prior art”).30 If a
prior art reference (such as a prior patent or publication) identically discloses
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (relying on 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)
(2015), which at the time stated: “A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears”). In SAS
Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, the Court held invalid as inconsistent with statutory language a PTO rule
that allowed the PTAB to institute review on only a subset of challenged claims. SAS Inst., Inc. v.
Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018).
28. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138
S. Ct. 960 (2018).
29. For an extended treatment and analysis of this approach see Rai, supra note 7, at 1042–65.
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012). Other legal rules and standards provide additional
grounds for rejecting patent applications or for challenging the validity of issued patents but are
beyond the scope of the discussion in text.
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an invention, the invention is not patentable because it fails the legal standard
of novelty.31 If there are differences between the invention and the prior art,
but those differences would have been obvious at the time to a person having
ordinary skill in the art, the invention is not patentable because it fails the
legal standard of nonobviousness.32
The Federal Circuit considers novelty determinations to be findings of
fact reviewable for clear error if made by district courts33 and for substantial
evidence if made by the PTO.34 But it considers nonobviousness
determinations to be conclusions of law that rest on underlying factual
findings.35 The Federal Circuit purports to review the underlying factual
findings with deference, while reviewing the ultimate determinations de
novo.36
The Supreme Court offers another approach, exemplified by the recent
decision in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC.37 That case
considered whether a reviewing court should review de novo or for clear error
a bankruptcy court ruling that a third party to whom a creditor transferred its
interest in a claim against a debtor was not an “insider” of the debtor.38 The
bankruptcy court ruled that the transferee—whose romantic partner was both
a corporate officer of the debtor and a board member of its owner—was not
an insider.39 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reviewing the decision for clear error
rather than de novo.40 The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the
question of whether the Ninth Circuit applied the correct standard of
review.41
The Court’s analysis is not bankruptcy-specific, but draws on wideranging cases considering judicial review of other mixed questions of law and
fact arising in other fields.42 There is nothing groundbreaking about this
decision, which follows a long line of cases attempting to identify
31. Id. § 102.
32. Id. § 103.
33. The clearly erroneous standard is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6),
which provides: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
34. REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC v. Neste Oil Oyj, 841 F.3d 954, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
35. See infra Section IV.A.
36. See infra Section IV.A.
37. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138
S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018) (highlighting that the question at issue was a mixed question of law and fact).
38. Id. at 963.
39. Id. at 963–64.
40. In re The Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part
sub nom. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1372 (2017), aff’d sub nom. Vill.
at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. at 969.
41. Vill. at Lakeridge, 137 S. Ct. at 1372.
42. In re The Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, No. 11-51994-BTB, 2013 WL 1397447, at *8 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2013).
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circumstances that call for deferential review of mixed questions of law and
fact.43 The Court described the bankruptcy court’s decision as involving some
“purely legal” aspects (i.e., the correct legal test for identification of insiders)
subject to de novo review, and some “purely factual” aspects (i.e., “who did
what, when or where, how or why”) reviewable for clear error.44 But, the Court
required a more nuanced approach for reviewing the ultimate determination
of “whether the historical facts found satisfy the legal test . . . the so-called
‘mixed question’ of law and fact at the heart of this case.”45
The appropriate standard of review for such mixed questions depends
on “the nature of the mixed question . . . and which kind of court (bankruptcy
or appellate) is better suited to resolve it.”46 The Court asked whether the
question “involves developing auxiliary legal principles of use in other cases”
or whether it “immerse[s] courts in case-specific factual issues—compelling
them to marshal and weigh evidence, make credibility judgments, and
otherwise address what we have . . . called ‘multifarious, fleeting, special,
narrow facts that utterly resist generalization.’”47
Under this functional analysis, greater appellate scrutiny is appropriate
for decisions that announce legal principles likely to have broader
implications for other matters, while greater deference is appropriate for casespecific decisions that rely on weighing evidence and are too narrow to be
generalizable in other cases. Conventional wisdom holds that appellate courts
charged with maintaining uniformity and coherence in the law are better than
trial courts at elaborating legal principles with broader implications, while
trial courts that are immersed in the evidence and can assess witness credibility
are better than appellate courts at making case-specific determinations that
rest primarily on an evidentiary record.48
Narrower appellate review of case-specific rulings may also limit the costs
of appellate review when the offsetting benefits are limited. These costs
include scarce appellate judicial resources as well as the burden on the parties
of prolonged litigation and delays in reaching final judgment.49 Excessive
immersion in case-specific details may distract appellate courts from broader
issues of law development and dissipate their advantage over trial courts in
taking in the big picture.50 Developing the law through generalizable rulings
43. See Nika Aldrich, Recent Supreme Court Cases May Require More Deference in Review of
Obviousness Cases, 56 J. FRANKLIN PIERCE CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. 1, 6–14 (2016) (reviewing cases
considering mixed questions of law and fact).
44. Vill. at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. at 965–66.
45. Id. at 966.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 967 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1988)).
48. For a thoughtful discussion, see Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and
Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 649–57 (1988).
49. Id. at 649–52.
50. Cf. Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 605–06 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he main reason for
appellate deference to the findings of fact made by the trial court is not the appellate court’s lack
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may be a more valuable use of appellate attention than correcting casespecific errors. Standards of review may shape appellate dockets by
encouraging certain appeals and discouraging others. Litigants may be less
likely to appeal case-specific rulings if they will be reviewed with deference,
and more likely to appeal rulings that will be reviewed de novo. The optimal
approach may change over time depending on a number of factors, including
the importance of developing and clarifying the law and of correcting
particularly costly errors, the need to achieve uniformity, predictability and
reliability of decisions in the field, the competence of lower tribunals, and the
capacity of appellate courts.
III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PTAB DECISIONS (COURT-AGENCY REVIEW)

The cases applying the functional analysis discussed in the previous
Section primarily involve judicial review of decisions of courts rather than
decisions of agencies. Although court-agency review has generally been more
deferential than court-court review,51 the implications of this line of cases for
Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions in AIA adjudications are nonetheless
unclear. This Section considers whether the APA, common law administrative
law, or the Patent Act call for a different standard of review.
The Supreme Court held in Dickinson v. Zurko that the APA governs
judicial review of PTO factual findings, leading the Federal Circuit to shift
from review for “clear error” to the more deferential “substantial evidence”
standard.52 But by this point, the Federal Circuit had already minimized the
significance of this shift through holdings that ultimate conclusions about
claim interpretation and nonobviousness are legal conclusions subject to de
novo review, even when they rest in part on subsidiary factual
determinations.53

of access to the materials for decision but that its main responsibility is to maintain the uniformity
and coherence of the law, a responsibility not engaged if the only question is the legal significance
of a particular and nonrecurring set of historical events.”).
51. See generally Bernard Schwartz, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 19 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1950) (describing the trend towards a narrower scope of
judicial review of mixed questions in pre-APA cases and predicting continuation of that trend
post-APA).
52. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 161–62 (1999); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(2012) (“[T]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title [concerning requirements for administrative hearings] or otherwise reviewed
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute . . . .”); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Although we have previously reviewed the Board’s factual
determinations in an obviousness analysis for clear error, we now review them for substantial
evidence.” (citations omitted)).
53. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(regarding claim interpretation), abrogated on other grounds by Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 904 F.3d 965 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska
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The APA does not provide clear guidance as to the proper standard of
review of legal conclusions by agencies. The statute arguably contemplates de
novo review by providing that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law” and that it shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; . . . [or] (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”54
But the actual practice of judicial review of agency decisions both before and
after passage of the APA has generally been more deferential.55
Under common law administrative law decisions, significant agency
rulings interpreting the statutes they administer often receive either Chevron
deference (on the theory that Congress has implicitly delegated to the agency
authority to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions with the force of law) or
Skidmore deference (if the court is persuaded by the thoroughness of the
agency’s reasoning and moved by considerations of consistency in
interpretation of the law over time).56 Either way, these decisions argue for
greater deference than the Federal Circuit currently gives to PTAB rulings
that work out the meaning of general statutory standards by applying them to
the facts of particular cases.57
The Patent Act provides for appeal of final written decisions of the PTAB
to the Federal Circuit58 but does not specify the standard of review. On one
view, failure to specify a different standard of review means that general APA
provisions for judicial review of agency decisions govern Federal Circuit
review of PTAB decisions.59 On another view, the failure of Congress to specify
a new standard indicates that it did not intend to disturb prior Federal Circuit
practices in reviewing other PTO decisions.60 On a third view, reflecting the
preference of four out of twelve Federal Circuit judges, the changes brought

Werkstad v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 705 F.2d 1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Obviousness is a
legal conclusion based on factual determinations and not a factual determination itself.”).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (emphasis added).
55. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 16, at 897–900; Schwartz, supra note 51, at 73–75.
56. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 16, at 910–13. Some commentators have questioned
whether these authorities are consistent with the language of the APA. See id.
57. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing implications of INS v. CardozaFonseca for deference to PTAB rulings).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c).
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (“This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except
to the extent that–(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law.”). The Supreme Court relied on this language in Dickinson. Dickinson
v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999).
60. Federal Circuit Judges O’Malley, Wallach, and Stoll evidently feel constrained to follow
this view, although they believe less deference to PTAB factfinding would be more consistent with
the goals of the AIA. See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 820 F.3d 432, 433 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(O’Malley, J., concurring in denial for rehearing en banc).
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about by the new AIA proceedings argue for less deference to PTAB rulings
rather than more.61
These judges make four arguments. First, Judge Newman argues that
deferential review is inadequate to achieve the legislative goal of correcting
PTO mistakes.62 Second, inasmuch as the new proceedings are designed to
substitute for district court proceedings, Judge O’Malley argues that PTAB
findings should be reviewed under the same clear error standard used in
reviewing non-jury findings of district courts.63 Third, because the statute sets
the standard of proof before the PTAB as preponderance of the evidence,64
rather than the higher clear and convincing evidence standard that patent
challengers face in district court litigation,65 Judge Newman argues that closer
appellate scrutiny is necessary to ensure accuracy of PTAB rulings.66 Fourth,
Judge Newman argues that less deferential review is appropriate because
Federal Circuit review is the only opportunity to correct errors in these
proceedings, unlike other PTO decisions that are also subject to review by the
Director or in de novo proceedings in the district courts.67
Each of these arguments rests on the dubious premise that greater
appellate scrutiny should counteract the effects of AIA design features that
facilitate patent challenges before the PTAB. Congress chose to address the
concern that examiners were issuing too many invalid patents by creating new
administrative tribunals as an alternative to generalist trial courts for
adjudicating patent challenges. This choice to depart from the model of
district court litigation cautions against reflexive replication of its features.
The lower statutory burden of proof for establishing invalidity before the
PTAB68 may indicate that Congress has greater confidence in PTAB panels,
staffed by “persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability,”69 than
it has in district courts to reach correct decisions. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
has justified the higher clear and convincing evidence burden in district
courts as a form of deference to the expertise of the PTO, which issued the
patent.70 It seems a dubious interpretive move to use heightened appellate

61. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 820 F.3d 432, 433 (2016) (O’Malley, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 840–41.
63. Gnosis S.P.A., 820 F.3d at 434–35 (per curiam) (O’Malley, J., concurring).
64. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e).
65. Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
66. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d at 841 (Newman, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 840–42.
68. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (providing that in IPR and PGR proceedings “the
petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance
of the evidence”).
69. Id. § 6(a).
70. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[D]eference to the
decisions of the USPTO takes the form of the presumption of validity . . . . Since we must presume
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scrutiny to cancel the effects of the Congressional choice to set a lower burden
before the PTAB. Once these features are recognized as deliberate choices
rather than inadvertent bugs, it is at least as plausible that Congress intended
to bring about more deference to PTAB rulings rather than less.
Moreover, by making PTAB decisions on whether to institute an IPR or
PGR proceeding “final and nonappealable,”71 Congress showed willingness to
constrain judicial review in favor of quick and efficient resolution by the
PTAB.72 Limiting opportunities for judicial review accelerates the resolution
of patent challenges, a legislative goal that is manifest in the tight deadlines
for each step in PTAB proceedings.73
The statute also provides for appeal of PTAB decisions to the Federal
Circuit.74 Even though appellate review inevitably adds costs and delays that
interfere with expeditious resolution of disputes, Congress plainly
contemplated a role for judicial review. But the scope of Federal Circuit review
of PTAB rulings could determine the success of these new proceedings in
achieving legislative goals.
IV.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVIEW OF NONOBVIOUSNESS AND CLAIM
INTERPRETATION

The Federal Circuit’s characterization of mixed questions of law and fact
as legal conclusions has the effect of calling for de novo review of case-specific
rulings for which the Federal Circuit has no clear functional advantage over
expert PTAB panels. De novo review of these decisions threatens to undermine
the system that Congress has chosen to improve quality control in the patent
system through expeditious adjudication before expert administrative
tribunals.
It is important not to confuse the words courts use to define standards of
review with the actual deference they give to decisions of lower tribunals. A
court purporting to apply de novo review may routinely affirm rulings, while a
court purporting to review for substantial evidence may review skeptically and
reverse frequently. To tell the difference, one must examine what reviewing
courts actually do, not merely what they say in rote language set forth in
opinions.
Arguably, the Federal Circuit has been more deferential toward PTAB
rulings in its actual decisions than in its articulations of standards of review.

a patent valid, the patent challenger bears the burden of proving the factual elements of invalidity
by clear and convincing evidence.”).
71. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e).
72. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (rejecting
interpretation of statute to preclude only interlocutory appeals from institution determinations,
while allowing eventual judicial review of such determinations on appeal from final decision).
73. E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 313 (“Preliminary response to petition”), 314(b) (“Institution of inter
partes review”), 316 (“Conduct of inter partes review”).
74. Id. § 319.
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The Federal Circuit has affirmed roughly three out of four PTAB decisions,
although the rate of affirmance appears to be declining.75 On the other hand,
according to one recent statistical analysis of 2017 decisions, the Federal
Circuit’s rate of affirmance for PTAB rulings (76%) was almost the same as its
rate of affirmance for district court decisions (74%),76 suggesting only
marginally greater deference to the PTAB than to district courts in actual
outcomes.77 This is particularly surprising given selection bias in the cases
considered by the PTAB, which has nonreviewable discretion to decline to
institute review and may only institute review if it determines “that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
one of the claims challenged.”78 Parity in reversal rates for the PTAB and
district courts is consistent with a formal approach to standards of review that
rests on a strict bifurcation between law and fact regardless of the tribunal.
After initial ambiguity, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court now
characterize both nonobviousness and claim interpretation as legal
conclusions with evidentiary underpinnings. Both courts agree that
underlying factual determinations should be reviewed with deference, while
the ultimate conclusions should be reviewed de novo. Despite this formal
similarity, in recent practice, Federal Circuit review of nonobviousness
conclusions has become more deferential, with affirmance often following
from a conclusion that evidence in the record supports implied underlying
factual findings. At the same time, review of claim interpretation has become
less deferential, with lower court interpretations often reversed on appeal
notwithstanding support in the evidentiary record. The divergence reflects
differences in the practices that the courts have approved to guide trial courts
in making these determinations.

75. See Michael Joffre et al., PTAB at 5: Part 3—Fed. Circ. Statistics, LAW360 (Sept. 13, 2017,
1:44 PM), https://www.sternekessler.com/sites/default/files/2018-01/PTAB_At_5_Part_3_%
E2%80%94_Fed._Circ._Statistics.pdf (“While affirmances have always been the predominant
outcome, the affirmance rate has drifted down in the past two years.”).
76. See Dan Bagatell, Fed. Circ.’s 2017 Patent Decisions: A Statistical Analysis, LAW360 (Jan. 5,
2018, 2:41 PM), http://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/1/8/v4/184121/Fed.-Circ.-s2017-Patent-Decisions-A-Statistical-Analysys.pdf.
77. Other studies have reached somewhat different results. One unpublished study—after
excluding claim interpretation rulings, remands to the PTAB for insufficient explanation, and
jury decisions from District Courts—concluded that the Federal Circuit affirms PTAB rulings on
validity at a higher rate (91.1%) than it affirms similar rulings from District Courts (84.7%).
Matthew G. Sipe, Experts, Generalists, Laypeople—and the Federal Circuit 46 (Aug. 1, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3228585. But that disparity is driven almost entirely by differences in rates of affirmance of
fact finding, with legal conclusions affirmed at approximately the same rates for both tribunals. Id.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), (d). For PGR, the standard for instituting review requires a finding
“that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is
unpatentable.” Id. § 324(a).
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A. NONOBVIOUSNESS
As the courts have elaborated the nonobviousness determination over
the years, it has become highly case-specific, consisting primarily of
consideration and weighing of evidence. Most of the cases involve court-court
review, but cases involving court-agency review are remarkably similar.
The requirement of nonobviousness, now codified in section 103 of the
Patent Act, began as a common law requirement for “invention” that courts
treated as a question of fact.79 The modern approach to the law/fact
distinction for the codified standard of nonobviousness emerged from the
following passage in the 1966 decision of the Supreme Court in Graham v.
John Deere:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the § 103
condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must
be satisfied, lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under
§ 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be patented.80
It is unclear what the Court meant by “the ultimate question of patent
validity is one of law.” The cases do not hold that every “condition” of patent
validity presents a question of law. The Federal Circuit codes at least one such
condition––novelty under section 102––as a question of fact.81 What is clear
is that the Court saw nonobviousness as involving “several basic factual
inquiries.”82
The Supreme Court later took note of the ambiguity in Dennison v.
Panduit and sought “the Federal Circuit’s informed opinion on the complex
issue of the degree to which the obviousness determination is one of fact.”83
79. Keyes v. Grant, 118 U.S. 25, 37 (1886) (reversing directed verdict where both sides
introduced expert testimony because “this was a question of fact, properly to be left for
determination to the jury”).
80. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (citation omitted).
81. Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Other validity requirements that
have been coded as factual include utility under section 101, see Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989); the written description requirement under section 112, see Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2002); and the best mode requirement
under section 112 (although no longer a ground of invalidity). See Northern Telecom Ltd. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
82. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
83. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986).
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Elaborating on remand, the Federal Circuit explained that after determining
the factual issues identified in Graham v. John Deere:
[T]he decisionmaker confronts a ghost, i.e., “a person having
ordinary skill in the art,” not unlike the “reasonable man” and other
ghosts in the law. . . . In light of all the evidence, the decisionmaker
must then determine whether the patent challenger has
convincingly established that the claimed invention as a whole would
have been obvious at that time to that person. The answer to that
question partakes more of the nature of law than of fact, for it is an
ultimate conclusion based on a foundation formed of all the
probative facts.84
It is not clear why a conclusion “formed of all the probative facts” is more
legal than factual.85 The court seems to recognize the mixed character of the
conclusion by stating that it “partakes more of the nature of law than of fact”
and in the analogy to the “reasonable man.”86 The court justified its coding of
the ultimate conclusion as legal as “[facilitating] a consistent application of
that statute in the courts and in the [PTO],”87 presumably by setting the stage
for de novo review.
In its 2007 decision in KSR v. Teleflex,88 the Supreme Court clearly
accepted the Federal Circuit’s framing of nonobviousness as “a legal
conclusion based on factual determinations and not a factual determination
itself.”89 Yet notwithstanding this coding, nonobviousness is a highly casespecific determination that requires immersion in an evidentiary record.90
In both Graham and KSR, the Supreme Court stressed the case-specific
nature of the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. In Graham, the Court said
that “[w]hat is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be
uniformity of thought in every given factual context” but that it “should be
amenable to a case-by-case development.”91 In KSR the Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s efforts to formalize the nonobviousness inquiry through

84. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (on remand)
(citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1567.
88. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
89. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 705 F.2d 1565,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (en banc) (“Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying facts.”); Kinetic Concepts,
Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding the same).
90. See Ted L. Field, Obviousness as Fact: The Issue of Obviousness in Patent Law Should Be a
Question of Fact Reviewed with Appropriate Deference, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
555, 590 (2017) (arguing that courts should decide obviousness as a question of fact and not as
a question of law).
91. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
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“rigid and mandatory formulas . . . that deny factfinders recourse to common
sense.”92 In both cases the analysis focuses on case-specific and evidentiary
aspects of the determination.
In the years since KSR, the Federal Circuit has continued to recite that it
reviews the underlying factual determinations of district courts for clear error
(or for “substantial evidence” in jury cases) and the ultimate conclusion de
novo. But this purported de novo review has become increasingly perfunctory,
at least when the court finds sufficient evidence in the record to support the
subsidiary findings. It is the evidentiary record behind these findings, not
legal analysis of the conclusion, that dominates the decisions.
Increasing deference to lower courts may in part reflect expansion in the
number and significance of factual determinations underlying
nonobviousness. In addition to the statutory “factual inquiries” recited in
Graham, the Federal Circuit elevated what the Supreme Court characterized
as “secondary considerations [such] as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.”93 to the status of a fourth factor of
“objective evidence” that must be considered when offered.94 The Federal
Circuit treats findings on objective evidence as factual.95 The Federal Circuit
further expanded the evidentiary underpinnings of nonobviousness analysis
in cases requiring a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine
references (“TSM”) when a challenge for obviousness rests on more than one
source of prior art.96 Other factual underpinnings of nonobviousness include
whether there was a reasonable expectation of success97 and whether an
invention produces unexpected results.98 Litigants introduce evidence on
these factual underpinnings, generating a record that supports factual
findings and makes them difficult to reverse.
For cases tried to juries, appellate deference is even greater. First, factual
findings of juries are reviewed under the more deferential “substantial
evidence” standard99 rather than the clear error standard applied to findings

92. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. at 419, 421.
93. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.
94. Apple Inc., 839 F.3d at 1048 (“Objective indicia of nonobviousness must be considered
in every case where present.”).
95. See Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
96. E.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The
presence or absence of a motivation to combine references in an obviousness determination is a
pure question of fact.” (quoting In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000))).
97. E.g., Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The
presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of success is also a question of fact.”).
98. E.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 976–78 (Fed.
Cir. 2014), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 769 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reviewing with deference
findings on unexpected results).
99. Apple Inc., 839 F.3d at 1040. The substantial evidence standard also applies to jury
findings in other fields of law. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

E4_EISENBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

7/25/2019 5:04 PM

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO PTAB RULINGS

2403

of trial court judges.100 Second, although trial court judges typically enter
written findings of fact and conclusions of law that provide a detailed account
of the basis for their decisions, jury verdicts are less precise. Explicit reasoning
is more amenable to appellate review101 than unexplained conclusions. The
Federal Circuit does not require that juries specify the subsidiary facts that
they find but allows trial courts to submit the ultimate determination on
obviousness to juries.102 When a jury returns even a purely advisory verdict on
the ultimate determination of obviousness, the Federal Circuit “first
presume[s] that the jury resolved the underlying factual disputes in favor of
the verdict [] and leave[s] those presumed findings undisturbed if they are
supported by substantial evidence” before examining the ultimate legal
conclusion “de novo to see whether it is correct in light of the presumed jury
fact findings.”103 Although, in theory, the Federal Circuit might reweigh these
implicit factual findings to reach a different conclusion on de novo review,
having identified presumed findings that are consistent with the jury’s
conclusion, the Federal Circuit may be more likely to agree with it.
A deferential approach to lower court rulings on nonobviousness makes
sense under a functional approach. A legal conclusion that rests on weighing
explicit or implicit factual findings necessarily immerses courts in marshalling
and weighing evidence and making credibility judgments. Appellate review of
nonobviousness rulings requires exhaustive consideration of the record. The
resulting conclusions are deeply entwined in analysis of the case-specific
evidentiary record and are unlikely to have generalizable implications for
other cases.
Similar considerations also call for deference to PTAB rulings on
nonobviousness. The Federal Circuit articulates similar standards of review
for PTAB decisions on obviousness, stating that it reviews underlying factual
determinations for substantial evidence and the ultimate conclusion de
novo.104
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”).
101. The Supreme Court, in KSR, stated that “[t]o facilitate review, this analysis should be
made explicit.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
102. For an early example, see Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (“[I]t is not error to submit the question of obviousness to the jury. . . . [T]he role of the
jury in determining obviousness is not unlike its role in reaching a legal conclusion respecting
negligence. . . .”). See also McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1358, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(Michel, J., dissenting) (“The difficulty presented in this appeal is how to separate the role of the
jury to find facts . . . from the role of trial judges in reaching, or for us freely reviewing, the
ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, vel non. . . . with no identification of the jury’s resolution
of genuine disputes over material factual issues.”).
103. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d
1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
104. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
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But the PTAB, unlike juries, has to explain the evidentiary basis for its
findings and the reasoning behind its conclusions,105 making reversal much
easier. If the PTAB fails to explain its decision, the Federal Circuit does not
search the record for substantial evidence to support implicit findings.
Instead, it will vacate and remand the case with instructions to make the
necessary findings and to explain its reasoning more fully.106
The contrast between the Federal Circuit’s willingness to infer whatever
subsidiary fact findings would support jury decisions, and its insistence that
the PTAB explain the basis for its rulings, may look like less deferential review
of PTAB rulings than of jury rulings on the same issue. Yet functional analysis
seems to cut the other way. The greater expertise and experience of the PTAB
make it well suited to the job of applying legal standards for nonobviousness
to evidentiary records. The technological complexity of nonobviousness
determinations may pose a challenge for juries and even for generalist trial
courts, but these determinations are within the PTAB’s wheelhouse. The AIA
goal of accelerating resolution of patent challenges is an additional functional
reason for deferential review of PTAB rulings.
But perhaps lack of deference is the wrong way to characterize Federal
Circuit determinations that PTAB decisions lack adequate explanation. At
least formally, the basis for remanding or reversing in these cases is not
disagreement with the PTAB’s conclusions, but rather failure of the PTAB to
observe procedural requirements that apply to the PTO but not to juries. The
Patent Act and the APA require the PTAB to explain the basis for its decisions
in writing.107 A written explanation allows the Federal Circuit to review
whether the PTAB has complied with these and other procedural
requirements.108 When the Federal Circuit remands to the PTAB, it may be

105. Id. at 1363 (allowing the PTAB to invoke “common sense” in support of an obviousness
determination but noting “it must still be supported by evidence and a reasoned explanation”);
see also DSS Tech. Mgmt. v. Apple Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
106. In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata
Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
107. 35 U.S.C. §§ 318(a), 328(a) (2012) (requiring “a final written decision with respect to
the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added [by
amendment]”); 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (requiring “a brief statement of the grounds for denial” of a
petition or request unless “the denial is self-explanatory”). The APA imposes additional
requirements for formal adjudications, a category that the Federal Circuit has held includes IPRs.
See id. §§ 554, 557(c)(3)(A) (requiring “a statement of . . . findings and conclusions, and the
reasons or basis therefore, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the
record”); EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 859 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
108. See EmeraChem Holdings, 859 F.3d at 1345 (“We review the Board’s procedures for
compliance with the [APA] de novo, under which we must ‘hold unlawful and set aside agency
action . . . not in accordance with the law [or] . . . without observance of procedure required by
law.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706)).
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enforcing these procedural requirements rather than withholding deference
from substantive determinations.109
It is possible, however, that the Federal Circuit is using remands for
inadequate explanation rather than reversing for legal error when it disagrees
with the PTAB’s rulings. When the Federal Circuit remands for further
explanation rather than using de novo review to clarify the legal errors of the
PTAB, it implicitly recognizes that the PTAB is in a better position than the
Federal Circuit panel to apply the law to the facts of the case.110 But remands
delay quick resolution without the offsetting benefit of providing
generalizable guidance from the appellate court as to the applicable law.
Indeed, when the Federal Circuit remands for further explanation, it often
uses nonprecedential opinions, a designation indicating that the opinion
does not significantly add to the body of law and should not provide binding
precedent for future courts.111
Functional analysis favors deferential review of PTAB determinations on
nonobviousness given the case-specificity of these rulings, the expertise of the
PTAB, and the importance of prompt adjudication of patent challenges
under the AIA. Recent Federal Circuit decisions suggest a possible trend
towards remand of more nonobviousness challenges to the PTAB for
insufficient explanation.112 Although it is surely important for administrative
tribunals to explain the basis for their decisions, remands should be used
sparingly to preserve the value of these proceedings as an expeditious
alternative to litigation.
B. CLAIM INTERPRETATION
The black letter standard of review for claim interpretation sounds
remarkably similar to that for nonobviousness: It is a legal conclusion that the
Federal Circuit reviews de novo, although it may rest on factual determinations

109. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, 805 F.3d at 1367 (remanding for clarification of whether
Board’s rejection of petitioner’s reliance on a particular piece of evidence rested on a legally
permissible ground or on an improper ground).
110. E.g., PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Iancu, 739 F. App’x 615, 628 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (issuing a
second remand to the PTAB for failure to give adequate weight to objective evidence of
nonobviousness after reaching same conclusion on first remand); Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., 726 F. App’x 787, 791 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding for failure to explain finding that
reference fails to disclose claim limitation). On the other hand, some opinions have sought to
discern a basis for affirming PTAB decisions, “even if that path is less than perfectly clear.” Cablz,
Inc. v. Chums, Inc., 708 F. App’x 1006, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential opinion).
111. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(b), (d); see e.g., Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 F.
App’x 946, 948–49 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential opinion).
112. See, e.g., Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, 805 F.3d at 1368;
cf. DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reversing
obviousness determination without remand where record did not contain sufficient explanation
for decision).
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reviewed for clear error.113 Despite this formal similarity, Federal Circuit
review has been notably less deferential for claim interpretation than for
nonobviousness.
Challenges to PTAB rulings on claim interpretation have a higher
likelihood of success at the Federal Circuit than any other grounds for appeal,
accounting for close to a third of reversals and remands in one recent tally.114
This is unsurprising, because claim interpretation lurks behind most validity
disputes, with errors in claim interpretation requiring reversal of validity
rulings on appeal.
Current claim interpretation practices are of quite recent origin. In the
past, patent infringement actions were generally tried before courts rather
than juries, with courts interpreting claims as necessary to address validity and
infringement.115 This pattern changed in the 1970s as patent owners
increasingly sought jury trials in infringement actions.116 Trial courts would
instruct juries on claim interpretation along with instructions on related
disputes about validity and infringement.117
Claim interpretation by juries ended abruptly with the decision in
Markman v. Westview.118 A majority of the Federal Circuit held en banc that
claim interpretation is a matter of law for the court,119 with three judges
writing separately to recognize that claim interpretation involves at least some
factual aspects.120 The Supreme Court agreed it was proper for the trial court
to interpret the claim language without deference to the jury, but avoided a
crisp bifurcation between law and fact, recognizing that construing claim
language was a “mongrel practice.”121 The Court emphasized functional
considerations to conclude that claim interpretation was better suited for
judges than juries, noting that judges have legal training and skills in exegesis
and that assigning the task to judges promotes uniformity in interpretation.122

113. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015)), overruled on other grounds by
Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
114. Rachel L. Emsley et al., Lessons Learned from Appeals of PTAB Decisions, FINNEGAN
(Mar./Apr. 2017), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/lessons-learned-from-appeals-ofptab-decisions.html.
115. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13–18 (2013).
116. Id. at 18–20.
117. Id. at 21 (citing Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal
Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1994)).
118. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–89 (1996).
119. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
120. Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring); id. at 998 (Rader, J., concurring); id. at 999 (Newman,
J., dissenting).
121. Markman, 517 U.S. at 378–84.
122. Id. at 388–90.
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This decision led to a revolution of claim interpretation practices in
litigation.123
The Supreme Court opinion in Markman did not address the standard of
appellate review for claim interpretation decisions. The Federal Circuit
maintained its position in Markman that claim interpretations were legal
conclusions subject to de novo review,124 although a minority of Federal Circuit
judges continued to argue for greater deference to trial court factual
determinations that underlie claim interpretation.125
The Supreme Court ultimately required greater deference to lower court
factfinding in Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Sandoz,126 holding that the Court of
Appeals should review for “clear error” the trial court’s resolution of
underlying factual disputes.127 But the Court’s simultaneous approval of two
other Federal Circuit positions—that the ultimate issue of claim
interpretation is a legal conclusion subject to de novo review and that clear
error review applies only to findings based on “extrinsic evidence” such as
expert testimony128—limited the impact of this ruling. The Teva decision thus
represents a shift towards the Federal Circuit’s formalist sorting of the
“mongrel practice” of claim interpretation into distinct categories of factual
underpinnings and legal conclusions.129
Coding claim interpretations based on “intrinsic evidence” (i.e., review
of the patent and its prosecution history) as purely legal analysis without
factual underpinnings is of recent and uncertain provenance. It contradicts
the Federal Circuit’s own practice in its first decade, when it repeatedly

123. See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE § 5 (3d ed. 2016).
124. See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1292
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control LLC
v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015), remanded, 790 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
125. E.g., Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring) (“Though we review [the trial
court] record ‘de novo,’ . . . common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry weight.”);
id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“[T]hat claim construction is an issue of law does not mean
that . . . we will give no weight to a district court’s conclusion . . . .”); id. at 1463–64 (Mayer, C.J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Court [in Markman v. Westview] chose not to accept our formulation of claim
construction[] as a pure question of law to be decided de novo in all cases on appeal. . . .”); id. at
1473–74 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part, and joining in part) (describing that
de novo review postpones certainty about claim interpretation until the end of litigation and thus
aggravates the uncertainty that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Markman). When the
Federal Circuit finally revisited its use of de novo review en banc, a majority voted to affirm. Lighting
Ballast Control, 744 F.3d at 1283. But some members of the court dissented vigorously. Id. at 1296
(O’Malley, J., joined by Rader, C.J., Reyna, J., & Wallach, J., dissenting).
126. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
127. Id. at 840–41 (resolving disputes about the meaning of a claim term to practitioners in
the relevant art in light of extrinsic evidence may present an underlying factual issue).
128. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 841.
129. Scholars have questioned the coherence of efforts to sort rulings into distinct categories
of law and fact. E.g., Cooper, supra note 48, at 659–60; Rai, supra note 7, at 1042–44; Schwartz,
supra note 51, at 73–75.
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recognized that interpretation of prosecution history in the course of claim
interpretation may present disputed factual questions.130 This prior approach
is consistent with the longstanding practice of treating the content and
meaning of patent specifications as presenting factual questions when they
are considered as prior art.131 The Federal Circuit treats the question of
whether a prior art patent discloses a claimed invention (and thus defeats its
novelty) as factual.132
The specification and prosecution history of a patent may be more
reliable evidence of the meaning of claim language than the sources that
count as extrinsic evidence (such as expert testimony), but that does not
change its evidentiary character. Moreover, if reliability is the basis for the
distinction, it seems perverse to give less deference to interpretations based
on more reliable intrinsic evidence, and more deference to findings based on
less reliable extrinsic evidence. That intrinsic evidence, consisting entirely of
documents, is equally available to appellate and trial courts does not justify a
departure from clear error review under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.133
Post-Teva, the Federal Circuit uses a variety of moves to avoid formal
deference to any aspect of claim interpretation.134 When the record includes
extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit sometimes concludes that the trial
court made no findings of fact based on that evidence that require deferential
review.135 The Supreme Court arguably approved this approach in Teva by

130. See, e.g., Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“[C]laim interpretation may require the factfinder to resolve certain factual issues such as what
occurred during the prosecution history.”); Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (“[T]he determination of the scope of the claim—its interpretation and proper
construction—while denominated a question of law is in many cases based on the facts regarding the
patent’s history. . . . [U]nderlying factual issues in dispute become the jury’s province to resolve.”);
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (concluding
that the lower court’s fact finding on disputed prosecution history was “clearly erroneous”).
131. See Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810–11 (1986) (per curiam).
132. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., Panduit Corp. v.
Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (including among factual components
of nonobviousness analysis “what a prior art patent as a whole discloses”).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”).
134. Cf. Anderson & Menell, supra note 115, at 76 (arguing based on review of decisions
from 2000 through 2011 that after its 2005 decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), although the Federal Circuit continued to adhere to de novo standard
of review, actual reversal rates declined significantly). Because the study period ended in 2011, it
did not permit observation of the effects of either the 2015 Supreme Court decision in Teva
Pharmaceuticals v. Sandoz or the introduction of new AIA PTAB adjudications.
135. E.g., CardSoft, (assignment for the Benefit of Creditors), LLC v. VeriFone, Inc., 807
F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is not enough that the district court may have heard
extrinsic evidence during a claim construction proceeding—rather, the district court must have
actually made a factual finding in order to trigger Teva’s deferential review.”); Shire Dev., LLC v.
Watson Pharm., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that although the district
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observing: “As all parties agree, when the district court reviews only evidence
intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along with the
patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to
a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that construction
de novo.”136
Even if the trial court considered the extrinsic evidence relevant and
found facts on the basis of that evidence, if the Federal Circuit thinks that
consideration of extrinsic evidence was unnecessary because the intrinsic
evidence is sufficient on its own, it will ignore it on appeal and review the
claim interpretation de novo based solely on the intrinsic evidence.137
Another way that the Federal Circuit sidesteps trial court factfinding
based on extrinsic evidence is to hold that the extrinsic evidence amounts to
improper testimony as to a legal conclusion. Again, the Supreme Court
arguably invited this approach in Teva: “‘[E]xperts may be examined to
explain terms of art, and the state of the art, at any given time,’ but they
cannot be used to prove ‘the proper or legal construction of any instrument
of writing.’”138 On remand in Teva, a split Federal Circuit panel again held the
same claims invalid for indefiniteness without finding clear error in any of the
trial court’s findings based on extrinsic expert testimony. 139 These findings
played no apparent role in the majority’s de novo analysis of the meaning of
the claim language because the majority coded as questions of law all the
determinations that matter: “The meaning one of skill in the art would
attribute to the term molecular weight . . . is a question of law . . . .
Determining the meaning or significance to ascribe to the legal writings which
constitute the intrinsic record is legal analysis.”140 Yet in a revealing sign of
ambiguity as to whether its analysis amounted to legal conclusion or appellate
factfinding, the majority recited “that claim 1 is invalid for indefiniteness by

court received expert testimony in evidence, “there is no indication that the district court made
any factual findings that underlie its [claim] constructions”).
136. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 840–41 (2015).
137. E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(reviewing claim construction de novo and declining to consider “findings on [extrinsic] evidence
because the intrinsic record [was] clear”), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal,
872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
138. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88,
101–02 (1858)).
139. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1342–45 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The
Supreme Court’s decision in Teva was one of two decisions that it handed down at the same time
on the related issues of claim interpretation and the statutory requirement of claim definiteness.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). In Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the Court “h[e]ld that a
patent is invalid . . . if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the
scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014). The
Federal Circuit considered the impact of both decisions on remand in Teva.
140. Teva Pharm., 789 F.3d at 1342.
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clear and convincing evidence.”141 If the evidence matters, it is troubling that
the appellate court reached its decision while ignoring extrinsic evidence that
the trial court considered as to the meaning of the claim language to a person
having ordinary skill in the art. Nor is it necessary, as review for clear error
would still allow the Federal Circuit to reverse based on its review of both
extrinsic evidence and intrinsic evidence in a proper case.
One can sympathize with the impulse of the Federal Circuit to engage in
active appellate review of claim interpretation by trial courts. Surely claim
interpretation presents functional challenges for generalist trial courts
adjudicating patent cases. One way to address this challenge is to use experts.
Federal Circuit judges might also benefit from considering expert testimony
in the record rather than ignoring it. Whatever their expertise in patent law,
they cannot pretend to have expertise in the meaning of technical language
to persons of skill in the art for all (or even most) of the patents that come
before them. As Judge Newman observed in her dissenting opinion in
Markman, “when the technologic issues are complex, appellate fact finding is
probably the least effective path to accurate decisionmaking. . . . Appellate
briefs and fifteen minutes per side of attorney argument are not designed for
de novo findings of disputed technologic questions.”142
So long as legal standards for claim interpretation require analysis from
the perspective of a person of skill in the art, it behooves the courts to consult
extrinsic evidence to access that perspective rather than to rely on their own
inexpert reading of patent documents. If the credibility of hired experts is in
doubt, that argues for deference to the tribunal that is in a better position to
assess witness credibility rather than for ignoring that evidence on appeal.
That, after all, is a traditional functional justification for reviewing trial court
findings based on witness testimony for clear error rather than de novo.143
Another functional consideration favoring de novo review is the interest
in uniformity of claim interpretation. The Supreme Court cited this interest
as a reason to assign claim interpretation to judges rather than juries in
Markman, noting that uniformity would encourage innovation by providing
certainty to both the patentee and potential infringers about the reach of the
patent.144 Although intuitively appealing, this interest may be overstated.
Different lawsuits may raise different interpretive questions about the same
patent. In addition to citing different prior art, different defendants may use
different allegedly infringing technologies, raising distinct issues of validity
and infringement that test claim boundaries in different ways and call for
141. Id. at 1345. A dissenting panel member thought the majority’s conclusion was
inconsistent with the district court’s factual findings, which were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1346
(Mayer, J., dissenting).
142. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); see also Cooper, supra note 48, at 650–51 (explaining Rule 52).
144. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996).
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further claim interpretation. When the exact same issue arises again, issue
preclusion may bind the parties to the prior action, including the patent
owner.145 If the initial determination is treated as a legal conclusion, stare
decisis could also bind nonparties.146 On the other hand, if later proceedings
raise new interpretive questions, the prior claim interpretation may not be
dispositive even with stare decisis effect.147
A related concern is that parties who can get away with making
inconsistent arguments about claim interpretation in different proceedings
may offer distorted claim interpretations for strategic purposes, but if they will
have to live with the same claim interpretation in the future, they may be more
cautious.
Whatever the potential benefits of uniformity, de novo review comes at a
significant cost.148 Because claim interpretation lurks behind every other
ruling on validity and infringement, the prospect of de novo review makes the
outcome of patent litigation uncertain until appeals have been exhausted.
Such delays are particularly costly in patent litigation because patents are
wasting assets with expiration dates, and because further technological
change could be stalled by uncertainty as to the validity and scope of patent
rights.
The discussion so far has focused on Federal Circuit review of claim
interpretation in the district courts. The Federal Circuit uses essentially the
same approach in reviewing claim interpretation in PTAB adjudications, with
the difference that it reviews factual findings that draw on extrinsic evidence
for substantial evidence rather than for clear error. In both contexts, the
Federal Circuit reviews the ultimate claim construction de novo.149 And in both
contexts, the Federal Circuit often avoids deferential review of evidentiary
underpinnings by concluding that the intrinsic evidence is sufficient to
interpret the claims without considering extrinsic evidence.150 When the
145. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349 (1971); Phil-Insul
v. Airlite Plastics Co., 854 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
146. In Markman, the Supreme Court recognized this point. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
Subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have sometimes used the term “stare decisis” in giving
binding effect to the Federal Circuit’s own prior interpretation of claim language. E.g., Ottah v.
Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Miken Composites, L.L.C. v. Wilson
Sporting Goods, Co., 515 F.3d 1331, 1338 n.* (Fed. Cir. 2008).
147. See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(finding that where prior decision construed only the phrase “digital display” in the claim, dictum
concerning meaning of other claim language “has no issue preclusive effect”).
148. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes,
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2007).
149. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled on
other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
150. E.g., In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Microsoft Corp., 789
F.3d at 1297–99 (concluding on de novo review that the PTAB’s claim interpretation of disputed
term was “unreasonably broad” without considering its “findings on [extrinsic] evidence because
the intrinsic record is clear”).
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Federal Circuit interprets the claims de novo without reaching the extrinsic
evidence, the difference between substantial evidence and clear error does
not matter.
Functional considerations argue for more deference to claim
interpretations by the PTO than to claim interpretations by trial courts. After
all, the PTO has considerable expertise in patent claims. Patent applicants
draft claim language in accordance with conventions and requirements that
the PTO has established and codified in its rules.151The judges that make up
PTAB panels are required by statute to “be persons of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability.”152 Moreover, the functional argument for
deference is even stronger for PTAB rulings than for PTO decisions in the
course of patent prosecution because PTAB panels have more time and
resources available than PTO examiners, allowing them to do a more
thorough job.153
Until recently, one important difference between claim interpretation in
proceedings within the PTO (including PTAB adjudications) and claim
interpretation in patent infringement litigation stood in the way of
uniformity. Consistent with longstanding practice in other PTO proceedings,
the PTAB gave claim language “its broadest reasonable construction in light
of the specification . . . in which it appears” (broadest reasonable
interpretation or BRI),154 while the Federal Circuit requires district courts to
give claims their “ordinary meaning . . . as understood by a person of skill in
the art.”155 The courts granted Chevron deference to the PTO’s choice of the
BRI standard as within the scope of its statutory authority to promulgate
regulations governing IPR proceedings.156 The Federal Circuit reviewed the
PTAB’s claim interpretations under this standard for reasonableness in light
of the intrinsic evidence.157
Because BRI may lead to a broader interpretation than ordinary
meaning, and because broader claims are more likely to impinge on prior art
and therefore fall to a validity challenge, the BRI standard made it easier to
invalidate patent claims in PTAB proceedings than in district court

151. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75 (2018).
152. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
153. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 260.
154. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).
155. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
156. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–44 (2016).
157. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that
the BRI does not permit giving claims an interpretation that is “unreasonable under general claim
construction principles” (emphasis removed)), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v.
Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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litigation.158 The difference in standards frustrated uniformity.159 Prior
judicial interpretations of claim language under an ordinary meaning
standard were not binding in PTAB proceedings,160 and prior PTAB
interpretations under the BRI standard were not binding in the courts.161
The PTO recently changed its claim construction standard for AIA PTAB
adjudications to conform to the standard used in district court litigation.162 In
announcing the new rule, the PTO cited a study reporting that 86.8% of
patents at issue in AIA adjudications are also in litigation in the courts, and
asserted that use of the same claim interpretation standard would promote
uniformity and predictability across these proceedings.163 The PTO also noted
concern that unfairness could result from using a broader standard of
interpretation in AIA adjudications, leading to invalidations based on a
broader claim scope than the patent holder could assert in an infringement
action.164 With the change in standard, the PTAB will now consider prior
constructions of the claim from federal courts,165 and the PTO noted that the
change “increases the likelihood that courts may consider the PTAB’s
construction for a given patent.”166
This is a welcome development that recognizes that the PTAB plays a new
and different role in AIA adjudications of validity challenges than the PTO
played in the past.167 At one time, it could be argued that the PTO’s role was
to perform an initial sorting function for a large volume of patent
applications, most of which would prove inconsequential, while leaving it to
the courts to analyze more thoroughly down the road the validity of the subset
158. As Justice Breyer noted in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, the difference in claim
interpretation standards (preponderance of the evidence versus clear and convincing evidence)
creates a risk of inconsistent interpretations by the PTAB and district courts in proceedings
between the same parties involving the same patents. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
159. See Niky R. Bagley, Note, Treatment of PTAB Claim Construction Decisions: Aspiring to
Consistency and Predictability, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 315, 355–57 (2017).
160. Knowles Elecs., LLC v. Iancu, 886 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that
although “previous judicial interpretations of disputed claim term may be relevant to the PTAB’s
later construction of that same disputed term” under BRI, the “[PTAB] is not generally bound
by a previous judicial interpretation” under a different standard (citing Power Integrations, Inc.
v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015))).
161. SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. Deca Int’l Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding
that the PTAB is not bound by district court decisions using different claim construction standards).
162. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,340 (Oct. 11,
2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
163. Id. at 51,342 (citing Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB
and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2016)).
164. Id.
165. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018).
166. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,349.
167. Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 260 (justifying the use of BRI and preponderance of the
evidence standard in PTAB proceedings as allowing “[PTAB] decisions [to] do what the
examiners would have done had they had the PTAB’s extra time, resources, and expertise”).
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of patents that matter enough to generate litigation.168 The BRI standard may
have been good enough for this rough first cut. But the new AIA PTAB
proceedings are instead an alternative forum for adjudicating validity of the
patents that matter at the litigation stage. Rather than relying on the rough
and ready shortcuts of examiners, these proceedings combine process
features of litigation with the expertise and efficiency of an expert agency to
do the job better, more quickly, and at lower cost.
This change could potentially give PTAB claim interpretations preclusive
effect in infringement litigation between the same parties.169 So far, however,
the primary impact of PTAB claim interpretations has been on PTAB validity
rulings. When the Federal Circuit reverses a PTAB claim interpretation,
reversal of the validity ruling often follows, even when the validity ruling was
based on factual findings entitled to deferential review (such as lack of
novelty).170 The scope of review of claim interpretation is thus a highly
consequential issue.
It remains to be seen what impact the change in claim interpretation
standards in PTAB adjudications will have on Federal Circuit deference to
PTAB rulings on this issue. To the extent that the Federal Circuit sees claim
interpretation as a legal conclusion regardless of the lower tribunal, it may
continue to use the same standard of review for PTAB claim interpretations
that it applies to claim interpretations by district courts, with marginally
greater deference towards factfinding by the PTAB in the rare case in which
such factfinding matters. 171
On the other hand, perhaps some members of the Federal Circuit shared
the perception noted by the PTO that the BRI standard was unfair and led to
invalidation of patents that would have survived validity challenges if
interpreted using the approach of the courts in infringement actions.172
Perhaps this impression led to closer appellate scrutiny of PTAB rulings
applying the BRI standard, and perhaps the change to the claim
interpretation approach that the Federal Circuit prefers will give the Federal

168. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495–96 (2001).
169. Cf. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015) (applying
issue preclusion in trademark infringement action to decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board in an opposition proceeding that found confusing similarity between two marks).
170. E.g., Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
171. As discussed previously, the Supreme Court’s requirement for greater deference to
PTAB factfinding rarely matters because of the Federal Circuit preference for reliance on
intrinsic evidence which it reviews de novo. See supra notes 130–41 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Former Chief Judge Randall Rader famously referred to the PTAB as “death squads killing
property rights” in a speech before the AIPLA in 2013. Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death
Squads: Are All Commercially Viable Patents Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid.
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Circuit greater confidence in the fairness of PTAB proceedings, making it
more willing to defer to PTAB rulings.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit is scrupulous about articulating standards of review,
but it is open to question how much these formal standards really matter.
Consideration of recent decisions suggests that Federal Circuit review of
district court rulings on nonobviousness has become more deferential,
although its articulation of the standard of review has not changed.173 While
reciting the same standard, a reviewing court has considerable latitude to
review with greater or lesser deference depending on its own assessment of
what is appropriate. As law and institutions evolve, that judgment might
change.
When Congress first created the Federal Circuit, it expressed a policy in
favor of clarifying and standardizing patent law and making its application
more uniform and predictable.174 Active judicial review allowed the Federal
Circuit to establish its dominance in patent law and to refine its general
standards into bright-line rules,175 while close judicial oversight of casespecific rulings allowed it to reinforce its policy preferences on the ground.
The Federal Circuit maximized its opportunities for active review by coding
rulings that apply general legal rules to the facts of particular cases as legal
conclusions subject to de novo review on appeal.176 And given the limitations
of generalist trial courts and busy examiners, active appellate review may have
seemed like a sensible approach to a specialized appellate court concerned
with quality control.
Many things have changed in the 35 years since the Federal Circuit was
first created. The Supreme Court overturned many of the Federal Circuit’s
bright-line rules for achieving uniformity in favor of greater tolerance for
variation in the application of standards depending on case-specific
considerations.177 The larger the role of case-specific considerations, the
stronger the functional argument for deference to lower tribunals that are
immersed in the specifics of the case, and the weaker the argument for de novo
review to elaborate on generalizable legal rules. And of particular relevance
to judicial review of PTAB decisions, Congress sought to address concerns
about patent quality not by enlarging the role of the Federal Circuit, but by

173. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
174. Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 3–4.
175. Rai, supra note 7, at 1103–10; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and
Coherent Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 509–20 (2013) (stating
that the Supreme Court has reversed many bright line rules created by the Federal Circuit in
recent years in favor of more flexible standards).
176. Rai, supra note 7, at 1057–65.
177. Dreyfuss, supra note 175, at 512–13.
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providing for administrative adjudications of validity challenges before the
PTAB.
Congressional marching orders for separating the wheat from the chaff
in the patent system have shifted under the AIA, with implications for the
scope of judicial review. Yet formal standards of review from an earlier era
remain locked in place.
In this new environment, de novo review of PTAB rulings on case-specific
matters seems like a waste of judicial resources that conflicts with legislative
priorities. It encourages costly and time-consuming appeals and threatens to
undermine the effectiveness of the AIA in providing a quicker, cheaper, and
more expert alternative to district court litigation. As its caseload rises, the
Federal Circuit would do better to confine its use of de novo review to
generalizable legal rulings that provide guidance to the PTAB and the courts
in future matters, rather than attempting to replicate the work of the PTAB
from the appellate bench on routine rulings on claim interpretation and
obviousness.

